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Beyond Strauss, lies, and the war in Iraq:
Hannah Arendt’s critique of
neoconservatism
PATRICIA OWENS*
Abstract. What are we to make of the neoconservative challenge to traditional international
thought? Should we content ourselves, as many have done, to return to classical realism in
response? Rather than oﬀer another realist assessment of neoconservative foreign policy this
article turns to Hannah Arendt. In a very diﬀerent language, Arendt articulated a critique of
the dangers of moralism in the political realm that avoids realist cynicism. She is also better
placed to challenge the neoconservative vision of international aﬀairs, ideological conviction,
and their relationship to democratic society. Reading Arendt against Leo Strauss suggests that
the fundamental problem with neoconservative ideology concerns its understanding of the
place of philosophy in the public realm, the relationship between political thought and
practice, ideas and action. She suggests why neoconservatives may be experts at selling wars
but seem less adept at winning them.
I think commitment can easily carry you to a point where you no longer think.1
Since the 1970s, neoconservative thinkers have argued that the foreign policy
establishment in the United States, dominated by the realist mind-set, is too
risk-averse and, somewhat oddly considering its source, too conservative. Realism as
a theory of world politics is viewed as too relativistic, uncomfortable when speaking
in language of right and wrong. This damages the United States’ moral high-ground
and recognition of its own national greatness. In the past, neoconservatives argue,
realists underestimated the wealth of moral righteousness that was necessary to
sustain the sacrifices that eventually won the Cold War. The parched language of
‘stability’, ‘balance of power’ and the ‘national interest’ cannot rally the American
people to a visionary commitment. Its political rhetoric is incapable of sustaining
what President George W. Bush described as the ‘distinctly American international-
ism’ integral to fighting the new global war on terror. Realist ideas are insuﬃcient to
* For comments and other exchanges on earlier versions of this article I would like to thank Martin
Coward, Mary Dietz, Jean-Francois Drolet, Michael Evans, Pauline Ewan, T. X. Hammes, Patrick
Hayden, Michael Jago, Lyn Boyd Judson, Jerome Kohn, Tony Lang, Henry Shue, Nina Silove,
Keith Stanski, Dan Twining, George Welton and two anonymous referees. An earlier version was
presented at the University of Sussex and at a workshop arranged by the Leverhulme programme
on the Changing Character of War, University of Oxford. I would thank the participants for their
clarifying questions and comments.
1 Hannah Arendt, ‘On Hannah Arendt’, in Melvyn Hill (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the
Public World (New York: St. Martin’s Press), p. 308.
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mobilise the American public for the sacrifice of blood and money to keep the
Republic – and the world – safe today.2
Neoconservatism poses a powerful challenge to international theory. Its pro-
ponents speak of power and morality, credibility, interests and values.3 Liberal
internationalist ideas about human rights are repackaged in a neo-Reaganite
language of morality, US prestige and zealous patriotism. Unlike liberals, neocon-
servatives are not shy of unilateral military action; they embrace it. That ‘ideas
matter’ is an obvious claim to neoconservatives. But the content of their world-
changing ideas contains a diﬀerent emphasis to liberals. They use the language not of
international organisations and cooperation, but of patriotic moral clarity and the
historic, universal values of ‘America’. Neoconservatives share with realists a view of
world politics as dangerous. However, the world is not divided into competing states
rationally pursuing interests. The human condition is defined as a struggle between
good and evil. The fight against evil, as articulated by President Bush, is imbued with
greater meaning through the citation of religious conviction and eschatology.4
Neoconservatives are confident about the material and ideological power of the
United States to shape the human condition. In a vein similar to more optimistic
liberal-constructivist work, they believe in the power of ideas such as ‘freedom’ and
‘democracy’ to change the world when allied with American power.5
The dominant ideological justification for the United States invasion and occu-
pation of Iraq in 2003 was provided by neoconservatism. This is widely understood.
But some of the claims about the connection between the ideas of Leo Strauss
(1899–1973), the influential neoconservative philosopher, and the Iraq invasion have
been truly grand indeed. According to one critic of the Iraq war, Strauss and his
neoconservative followers provided the Bush administration with the politically
useful ‘philosophy of the noble lie, the conviction that lies, far from being simply a
regrettable necessity of political life, are instead virtuous and noble instruments of
wise policy’.6 Christopher Hitchens, influential supporter of the war, wrote that ‘part
of the charm’ of regime change in Iraq ‘is that it depends on premises and objectives
that cannot . . . be publicly avowed. Since Paul Wolfowitz [then Deputy Secretary of
Defense] is from the intellectual school of Leo Strauss . . . one may even suppose that
2 Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s
Mission (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003); Michael C. Williams, ‘What is the National
Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory’, European Journal of International
Relations, 11:3 (2005), pp. 307–37.
3 There are diﬀerences in emphasis among neoconservative foreign policy thinkers. For example,
Charles Krauthammer, a self-described ‘democratic realist’, diﬀers from William Kristol and
Robert Kagan who are more interventionist, more moralist, less classically ‘realist’. Krauthammer,
‘In Defense of Democratic Realism’, The National Interest (Fall 2004).
4 President Bush’s own religiosity should not be taken to assume that most neoconservative
intellectuals are also Christian, or even especially religious. And it must not be confused with any
idea that foreign policy neoconservatives are pursuing a specific religious agenda such as Zionism.
There is more continuity than change in Bush’s religious rhetoric. Every presidential inaugural
address has evoked the guiding hand of a Christian God. I thank Dan Twining for this point.
5 Alexander Wendt, ‘What is IR For?: Notes Toward a Post-Critical View’, in Richard Wyn Jones
(ed.), Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 205–24. ‘Liberal
idealism’, in the words of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, ‘need not be identical with masochism, and need not
be incompatible with the defense of freedom and the national interest’. ‘Dictatorships and Double
Standards’, Commentary, 68:5 (1979), p. 4.
6 Earl Shorris, ‘Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George Bush and the Philosophy of Mass Deception’,
Harpers Magazine, June 2004.
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he enjoys this arcane and occluded aspect of the debate’.7 On this view, the secret
premise behind the invasion of Iraq was that there were, indeed, ‘root causes’ behind
the 9/11 attacks: the Cold War policy of supporting despotic regimes in the Middle
East. The appearance of mendacity and misleading statements from the Bush
administration, the bold misrepresentation of intelligence estimates about weapons of
mass destruction, and dishonest arguments about links between Iraq and 9/11,
provoked wild accusations of conspiracy and lies to justify an otherwise unjustifiable
war.
The implication of such claims is that lying in politics is a sin peculiar to
neoconservatives and may even have been condoned by Leo Strauss.8 What should
we make of these allegations? There is an immediate temptation to dismiss such
views. Indeed, we should. The Bush administration’s notorious clash with factual
truth in relation to Iraq had little to do with any belief in ‘noble lies’. Certain of
Strauss’s works do indeed give the impression that political lying can be righteous,
even ‘noble’.9 Strauss did not clearly set out his own political thought. Rather others
have sought to decipher his views. This has led to much confusion and in-fighting
concerning what Strauss did and did not believe. While always noting the ‘obscurity’,
diﬃculty, and ‘alien character’ of his writing, Straussians seem to take pride in the
level of controversy provoked by his work; and, indeed, commentators observe that
his writing ‘continues to shatter respectable intellectual categories and rules’.10 But
lying in politics is not a sin peculiar to neoconservatives and would probably not have
been condoned by Strauss.11
However, there is a need for further reflection on Strauss and the philosophical
roots of neoconservative thought. It is possible to understand the contentious
political debates surrounding the invasion and occupation of Iraq, including the
appearance of mendacity, through a richer understanding of early neoconservative
thought. The ‘neoconservative persuasion’12 and its political influence are based on
more than a ‘cabal’ of influential men who are willing to lie on behalf of some greater
cause.13 It rests on firm and clearly set-out theoretical foundations directly relevant
7 Hitchens, A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq (New York: Plume, 2003), p. 17.
8 Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, updated edn., new Introduction (New York:
Palgrave, 2005); Kenneth R. Weinstein, ‘Philosophic Roots, the Role of Leo Strauss, and the War
in Iraq’, in Irwin Stelzer (ed.), The Neocon Reader (New York: Grove Press, 2004), pp. 201–12;
Larry George, ‘Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the
Bush Doctrine’, International Politics, 42:2 (2005), pp. 174–202.
9 It is possible to argue that Strauss believed that those who possessed wisdom about the natural
(hierarchical) order of social and political life must be cautious about the diﬀusion of this
knowledge; for the sake of the people and for the sake of the philosopher’s safety. He thus
appeared to suggest that philosophers ought to conceal their doubts about religion and truth to
sustain a number of functional myths. Through the concealment of dangerous truths both the
philosopher and the political order are protected. To lie, therefore, may be moral; it protects the
wise and maintains social order. The morally and intellectually inferior must believe in ‘noble lies’,
‘statements which, while being useful for the political community, are nevertheless lies’. Strauss,
The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 69, 66.
10 Thomas L. Pangle, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Leo Strauss, The Rebirth of Classical Political
Rationalism, p. vii.
11 Jenny Strauss Clay, ‘The Real Leo Strauss’, New York Times, 7 June 2003.
12 Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’ Weekly Standard, 47, 25 August 2003.
13 We are focused less on individuals and more on ideas and ideology. There is already a large
literature on the role of influential individuals and how they shaped the justification and conduct of
the invasion of Iraq. See Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who are Changing
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to contemporary public policy and justifications for war.14 It is through understand-
ing these foundations that we can begin to understand why neoconservative ideas
became so popular in the United States after the 9/11 attacks and how they helped
take the United States into the Iraq war.
Classical realists certainly oﬀer a persuasive critique of the dangers and
hypocrisy of moralising international aﬀairs and possess a more sophisticated
vision of domestic politics than is often assumed.15 These thinkers presaged some
of the concerns contemporary foreign policy analysts have expressed about the
neoconservative vision.16 But we should not content ourselves, as many have done,
to return to classical realism in response to the failures of neoconservatism in
Iraq.17 The realist-‘neocon’ conversation will no longer suﬃce. We must turn to
another interlocutor. In a very diﬀerent language from that of classical realism,
Hannah Arendt (1906–74) articulated a critique of the dangers of moralism in the
political realm that avoids realist cynicism.18 She is also better placed to challenge
the neoconservative vision of international aﬀairs, ‘the automatic thought-
reactions’ of ideological conviction and their relationship to democratic society.19
She reminds us that there is a natural clash between factual truth and politics that
is only exacerbated by the peculiarities of neoconservative ideology. To liberate
Iraq was ideologically mandated; influential neoconservatives had their theory and
strength of moral conviction ‘and’, to borrow Arendt’s words from a diﬀerent
context, ‘all data that did not fit were denied or ignored’.20 The origins of lying in
politics are found in the nature of the political realm itself. It is tempting and even
easy to lie in politics because the lie itself is a form of action. Almost by nature the
America’s Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); John Ehrman, The Rise of
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Aﬀairs 1945–1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York:
Viking Penguin, 2004). This article does not rely on any claims about the direct influence of Strauss
on specific men or their acceptance of the neoconservative label. See Robert Kagan, ‘I Am Not a
Straussian: At Least, I Don’t Think I am’, Weekly Standard, 20 November 2006.
14 Kenneth L. Deutsch and John A. Murley (eds.), Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American
Regime (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), and Michael C. Desch, ‘What Would Strauss Do?’
The American Conservative, 17 January 2005.
15 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (New
York: Knopf, 1960) and Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade (New York: Knopf, 1970).
16 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy, 137
(January–February, 2003), pp. 51–62; Philip Gold, Take Back the Right: How the Neocons and the
Religious Right Have Hijacked the Conservative Movement (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2004),
ch. 9; Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative
Legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Michael C. Williams, ‘Morgenthau Now:
Neoconservatism, National Greatness, and Realism’, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, forthcoming).
17 Robert Gilpin, ‘War is Too Important to be Left to Ideological Amateurs’, International Relations,
19:1 (2005), pp. 5–18; Williams, ‘What is the National Interest?’.
18 For an excellent account of the similarities and divergences between Arendt and classical realists
such as Morgenthau and Kennan see Douglas Klusmeyer, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Critical Realism:
Power, Justice, and Responsibility’, in Anthony F. Lang Jr. and John Williams (eds.), Hannah
Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines (London: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 113–78.
Arendt and Morgenthau were friends. According to a student of both, she considered ‘heroic’ his
‘resignation from the National Security Council – . . . the only member of Lyndon Johnson’s
administration to take such a step – in protest over the Vietnam War’. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,
Why Arendt Matters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 34.
19 Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 225.
20 Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 39.
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liar is an actor because the liar wants to change the world from what is to what
they want it to be.
In contrast to the repetitive and unchanging tasks of some other human activities,
political action is the realm in which we are truly capable of changing the world.
Given this ever-changing character, factual statements about what is the case are
fragile. For as Arendt wrote, ‘no factual statement can ever be beyond doubt – as
secure and shielded against attack as, for instance, the statement that two and two
make four’.21 Note the kind of truth to which Arendt was referring. She clearly
distinguished between rational truth and facts. Rational truth is the business of
philosophic speculation. Through rational argumentation (or simply faith) the
philosopher (or theologian) may believe they have constructed the truth of claims
such as ‘all humans are created equal’. This is not a factual ‘truth’ of the kind
political actors must establish to make proper judgements about the legitimacy of a
particular war.22
Arendt’s writing suggests that the fatal flaw of neoconservative ideology concerns
its understanding of the place of philosophy in the public realm, the relationship
between political thought and practice, ideas and action.23 These relationships do not
tell us everything we need to know about the changing character of war and its
relationship to democratic society. Nor do they tell us everything we need to know
about the politics of foreign policy debates within the Republican Party after 9/11.24
But we cannot fully understand the US decision to go to war in Iraq without
understanding the basic ideas and principles, revealed in the public culture and
rhetorical forms, shaping the political regime that started it. Arendt oﬀers a
systematic refutation of neoconservative ideas and its wider agenda in both domestic
and international politics. A critic of all forms of ‘hubristic radicalism’,25 she oﬀers
international theory new grounds – and a new way to articulate – older realist
concerns about the dangers of moralism, especially in wartime, and the arrogance of
power that believes the world can change because it is so willed and ideologically
mandated. Irving Kristol, so-called godfather of neoconservatism, once claimed that
‘in the modern world, a non-ideological politics is a politics disarmed’.26 But for
Arendt, it is in fact ideology that disarms politics.
21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1968),
p. 238.
23 Arendt rarely referred to neoconservatism and died before the full political force of its ideas were
felt. In a 1956 essay she wrote, ‘Neo-conservatism, which has won a surprisingly large following in
recent years, is primarily cultural and educational, and not political or social in outlook; it appeals
to a mood and concern which are direct results of the elimination of authority from the
relationship between young and old, teacher and pupil, parents and children’. ‘Authority in the
Twentieth Century’, Review of Politics, 18:4 (1956), p. 404.
24 The influence of neoconservatism in the Republican Party is obviously important. But we should
not assume that neoconservative foreign policy ideas are only attractive to those on the political
right. See Oliver Kamm, Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-Wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign
Policy (foreword by Martin Bell) (London: Social Aﬀairs Unit, 2005) and Thomas Cushman (ed.),
A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2005).
25 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 24.
26 Irving Kristol, Reﬂections of a Neoconservative Looking Back, Looking Ahead (New York: Basic
Books, 1983), p. ix.
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The search for a new foundation
There are a number of resemblances between the philosophical roots of neoconserva-
tism and the issues that concerned Hannah Arendt. German Jews in the early
twentieth century, Arendt and Leo Strauss began their intellectual journey from the
same place and from similar traditions of thought. Indeed, they were acquaintances
in the early years of Hitler’s rule and much later colleagues at the University of
Chicago. The Nazi take-over and destruction of European Jewry became the focal
point of their thinking about politics, and what was necessary for ‘the political’ to
have meaning in the post-Holocaust world. Both fled to the United States as a result
of World War II and with their arrival, as Anne Norton writes, ‘the study of the
political returned to the American academy, and with a vengeance’.27 Both drew
lessons from the politics and philosophy of Athens, though Arendt was far more
critical of what she found there. Both were critics of positivist social science. Strauss’s
influence on political philosophy in the United States has arguably been greater if we
take as evidence that ‘a school formed around’ him.28 Arendt and Strauss both wrote
about the American Founding and in many ways accepted the idea of America’s
political experience as exceptional.
Yet, the diﬀerences between Arendt and Strauss are far greater than their
similarities. This is the other motivation for initiating a further dialogue between
neoconservatism and Arendt. Her name has frequently been invoked in the context
of the recent resurgence of neoconservative thought, but as an inspiration and ally.29
Several thinkers associated with neoconservatism point to Arendt’s influence.30 The
story Norton tells about Leo Strauss is also, in part, a story told about Arendt.
Diverse schools of thought, to be sure, legitimately claim Arendt’s writing. She is one
of a number of ‘charismatic legitimators’.31 And the misreading of Arendt by
Straussians is not without some justification.32 But the association between Arendt
and neoconservativism is superficial at best. They possessed entirely diﬀerent
27 Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2004), p. 55.
28 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, ‘Introduction’, in Kielmansegg, Horst Mewes, and Elisabeth
Glaser-Schmidt (eds.), Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political
Thought after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 5.
29 Kristol, Reﬂections of a Neoconservative, p. 80; William Pietz, ‘The ‘‘Post-Colonialism’’ of Cold
War Discourse’, Social Text, 19–20 (1988), pp. 55–75; Norman Podhoretz, Ex-Friends: Falling Out
with Allen Ginsberg, Lionel and Diana Trilling, Lillian Hellman, Hannah Arendt, and Norman Mailer
(New York: Free Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress
for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2002),
pp. 43–4; Williams, ‘What is the National Interest?’, p. 316.
30 One historian of neoconservatism has noted that Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s ‘views were crystallised when
she heard Hannah Arendt speak . . . Arendt, who taught that the left was just as capable of
mounting terror as the right, was one of the shaping forces of neoconservatism’. Murray Friedman,
The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 154. ‘Here, as elsewhere one sees the aﬃnities between the
students of Strauss and the students of Arendt, for it is Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism
that is at work’. Norton, Leo Strauss, p. 128. In fact, Arendt was horrified that The Origins of
Totalitarianism (new edition with added prefaces: New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966)
became a staple of Cold War propaganda. She did not view post-World War II world politics as a
struggle between the forces of freedom and a monolithic Communism.
31 Martin Jay, Force Field: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York: Routledge,
1993), p. 168.
32 Some of Arendt’s concerns about politics in the modern age also echo those of Irving Kristol.
Arendt argued that the increasing identification of freedom with the ability to accumulate personal
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evaluations of political action. For Arendt, political action is unpredictable in its
outcomes. For Strauss and his neoconservative followers it is ideology that gives
political action its certainty and political actors their moral conviction.
There are a number of ways to reconstruct Arendt’s (usually hidden) criticisms of
Strauss and the foundations of neoconservative thought.33 Here we highlight their
diﬀerences over the relationship between politics and philosophy because it is at the
root of a number of flaws in neoconservative ideological thinking about the recent
past and the relationship between politics and war. Unlike Strauss, Arendt was
strongly against the idea that ancient philosophy could invigorate modern democ-
racy.34 Indeed, quite the reverse. She was highly critical of the anti-political character
of Greek thought, preferring to draw lessons from their political experience.35 Strauss
was far more attracted to Greek philosophy, implying that the many ought to (and
do) consent to be ruled by the virtuous few. Some of his harshest critics have taken
this to mean that one of the ‘defining features of his work’ was the ‘rejection of liberal
democracy’.36 This is over-stated and fails to take into account the complicated task
Strauss believed he had undertaken to save liberal democracy from ruin.
Strauss’s antipathies toward liberalism and democracy have been well-
documented, but not so well understood. He rarely praised democracy itself, fearing
the disorder that it might bring. But he also defended liberal democracy as the least
bad regime in the modern age. Indeed, the central problem of modernity, the basic
political-philosophical starting point for neoconservative thought, is belief in the
need for a new foundation for political order in the West. In the modern age, the
single legitimate foundation for government is the democratic consent of the people.
Liberal democracy places the people in the position of authority, not god or
philosophy. The opinion of the democratic people, which for Strauss (unlike Arendt)
was obviously inferior to philosophical truth, becomes the highest moral authority.
However, for Strauss, the implied tolerance of all views risked degenerating into the
belief that everybody’s views, everybody’s mere preferences, were equal. In the
absence of older forms of religious and moral virtue, with the lack of authoritative
truth, Strauss feared a dangerous vacuum had been created. As Irving Kristol,
perhaps one of the most noted inheritors of Straussian thought, also believed,
modern society was in a state of spiritual disintegration, aﬄicted by relativistic,
‘nihilistic’ decadence in which ‘the individual must be free to create his own
morality’.37
Uninterested in true universal knowledge and authentic political action, the
over-riding concern of the modern individual, Strauss feared, was the pursuit of mere
pleasure and wealth, a ‘joyless quest for joy’.38 Since Max Weber, social science had
wealth, and the triumph of the archetypal liberal freedom from politics, deformed the political
sphere.
33 Also see Ronald Beiner, ‘Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: The Uncommenced Dialogue’, Political
Theory, 18:2 (1990), pp. 238–54.
34 Dana Villa, ‘The Philosopher versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and Socrates’, in Politics,
Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press 1999), pp. 155–79 and ‘Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: Citizenship versus Philosophy’, in
Socratic Citizenship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 246–98.
35 This has led to false accusations of nostalgia and Hellenism (even by Straussians!) in Arendt’s
work. See Pangle, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p. xxiv.
36 Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 4.
37 Irving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 69.
38 Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 251.
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argued that the ends of political life were without foundation. Since ‘all these former
illusions . . . have been dispelled’, Weber wrote, ‘the ultimate and most sublime
values have retreated from public life’.39 The consequences for modern politics and
society were immense; the political and the ethical were now distinguished and the
logic of each was ‘governed by diﬀerent laws’.40 Strauss viewed acceptance of this
condition as a recipe for disaster and a denial of the true force of ‘the political’. In
the words of Kristol, ‘one is led to question the validity of the original liberal idea
that it is possible for the individual . . . to cope with the eternal dilemmas of the
human condition. The moral authority of tradition, and some public support for this
authority, seems to be needed’.41
Strauss rejected the ‘historicist’ or ‘relativist’ argument that all value-claims
concerning moral authority were contingent on particular historical circumstances.
Conflict over values, Strauss believed, ought to be conducted through and expressed
in ‘universal terms’, that is, of the ‘political order which is best always and
everywhere’.42 In Natural Right and History, he invoked the passage in the American
Declaration of Independence related to self-evident truths and unalienable rights.
This ‘self-evidence’, he suggested, is endangered by the ‘retail sanity and wholesale
madness’ of relativism and historicism. Strauss wrote:
Political things are by their nature subject to approval or disapproval, to choice and
rejection, to praise and blame. It is of their essence not to be neutral but to raise a claim to
men’s obedience, allegiance, decision, or judgment. One does not understand them as what
they are, as political things, if one does not take seriously their explicit or implicit claim to
be judged in terms of goodness or badness, of justice or injustice . . . To judge soundly one
must know the true standards.43
Any eﬀort to avoid value judgements about the fundamental questions of the human
condition was an absurdity and aﬀront to decency and morality.
Both Strauss and Kristol believed that the new foundation for the modern age was
located in the first principles of the American regime. There are things ‘essential to
all political communities’. The most important is the founding of the political
constitution, the ‘permanent framework within which the right handling of changing
situations by excellent politicians or statesmen can take place’.44 Diﬀerent regimes
encapsulate and embody diﬀerent answers to the profound questions of political
organisation as well as represent the particular, specific language and customs of a
community. Many of Strauss’s ideas centre on the importance of political regimes
and involve quasi-religious praise for the founding of the American republic. During
this founding, philosophical statesmen displayed the ‘most ‘‘architectonic’’ political
skill that is known to political life’.45 In this moment of political excellence wise men
designed a political order to which the modern masses could consent.
39 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946),
pp. 143, 155.
40 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 123.
41 Kristol, Two Cheers, p. xi.
42 Strauss, Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 56.
43 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1988), p. 12.
44 Strauss, Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 53.
45 Ibid., p. 53. ‘Bush’s advocacy of ‘‘regime change’’ – which avoids the pitfalls of a wishful global
universalism on the one hand, and a fatalistic cultural determinism on the other – is a not
altogether unworthy product of Strauss’s rehabilitation of the notion of regime’. Steven Lenzner
and William Kristol, ‘What was Leo Strauss up to?’, The Public Interest, 153 (2003), p. 38.
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In the past, ‘noble’ men acted with a dignity in politics now largely absent in the
modern age. But politics itself, Strauss nonetheless argued, ‘derives its dignity from
something which transcends political life’. Defending Plato’s hierarchical ordering of
human activities, Strauss believed ‘political life was necessarily inferior to contem-
plative life’.46 Where the former dealt with mere opinions, the latter activity was
capable of discerning true standards; it was ‘the ascent from opinions to knowledge
or to truth’.47 As such, the political philosopher is the ‘umpire’, who rules over and
settles the political controversies of the unruly public sphere. Philosophical truth
transcends the political realm of mere opinion. This is possible because the
‘knowledge of the political philosopher is ‘‘transferable’’ to the highest degree’. As
evidence, Strauss cited Plato’s frequent comparisons between ‘political science and
medicine’.48
The privileging of philosophy over political action, truth over opinion, according
to both Strauss and Arendt, originated in Plato’s exasperation with democratic
political action after the trial and death of Socrates. The philosopher-citizen, the
questioner, was condemned for leading astray the Athenian youth. It was precisely
the uncertainty and unpredictability of political action, the fact that the public was
often arbitrary and irrational (to such a degree that Socrates is killed) which explains
the long-standing desire of philosophers to escape from politics and eliminate its
negative consequences. Arendt quotes Pascal: ‘The most philosophic [thing] was to
live simply and quietly. If they [Plato and Aristotle] wrote on politics, it was as if
laying down rules for a lunatic asylum’.49 Before outlining the neoconservative
solution to the dangers of unruly public action we must briefly pause to note Arendt’s
objection to Plato’s hierarchical ordering of philosophy over politics, rational truth
over democratic opinion, that so animated Strauss.
Arendt considered it in the very nature of philosophy to be hostile to politics.
Philosophy requires withdrawal from the public world. She referred to thinking itself
as the solitary internal ‘dialogue between me and myself’.50 In contrast to the
worldliness of political action, thinking was ‘unworldly’. The activity of the
philosopher is essentially passive. Where thinking is done in solitude, politics always
encounters a plurality of opinion; political knowledge is always perspectival. Though
thinking importantly thrives on an anticipated communication with others, there is
no unity between thought and political action.51 Indeed, even if this were so it would
not be fortuitous: ‘You can’t say A without saying B and C and so on, down to the
end of the murderous alphabet’.52
The anti-democratic and anti-political character of attempts to govern politics
through ideology or philosophy was clear to Arendt. It was a principled dimension
of her work that such endeavours were destructive of the very political freedom these
blueprints sought, at least in theory, to render. Politics is such that no theory can
46 Strauss, Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 64, 161.
47 Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 124.
48 Strauss, Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, p. 54.
49 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1982), p. 22.
50 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 220.
51 Of course, Arendt believed that thinking and acting were connected. However, she rejected the
eﬀort to ensure that the mentality of one enjoyed hegemony over the other.
52 Arendt, Origins, p. 472.
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adequately be ‘applied’ without destroying the very essence of political life.53 To
think and to act are not the same: ‘all our categories of thought and standards for
judgment seem to explode in our hands the instant we try to apply them’.54 The point,
contra Strauss, is that politics involves ‘matters of opinion and not the truth’.55
Opinion and truth can be considered as almost opposites. Talking something through
and forming an opinion, an ‘opinion among opinions’, is central to the formation of
a political realm. For Arendt, opinion, doxa, is not ‘mere’ opinion, as it is for Strauss.
Like Strauss, Arendt believed that some forms of truth were an anathema to
politics, but for an entirely diﬀerent reason. Modes of thought and communication
that claim truth, she believed, ‘are necessarily domineering’ because ‘they don’t take
into account other people’s opinions . . ., the hallmark of all strictly political
thinking’.56 Profound ‘truth’ needs no agreement. It simply is. As noted by Strauss,
the American Declaration of Independence sought to enshrine certain principles,
such as the idea that ‘all men are created equal’, as beyond dispute. This is why
certain ‘truths’ were deemed ‘self-evident’. But the statement of equality was not
‘true’; it was a matter of agreed opinion. Contra Strauss, these opinions were held
not because they were self-evidently ‘true’, but because they were necessary for
democratic politics to begin; ‘freedom is possible only among equals’.57 Arendt
emphasised the authority of the agreement ‘we hold’, rather than the ‘self-evident’
nature of the truth when Jeﬀerson declared ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’.58
The significant revolutionary action was the ‘necessarily relative’ agreement. In the
absence of ‘transcending standards, everything remains relative’.59
Since Plato, however, philosophers have sought to construct absolute standards,
appropriate models for political conduct that could be applied to human aﬀairs.
Dana Villa nicely summarises Arendt’s diagnosis of the eﬀect on almost the entire
tradition of Western political thought: ‘Throughout . . . the faculty of reason is called
upon to identify the idea or telos of justice, and to show how this idea can be realized
concretely in the world. In Plato, Hobbes, Hegel, and Marx the ‘‘theoretical’’
analysis first isolates the (ideal) end, and then reveals the means by which it will
be – or has been – produced (by philosopher-kings, a sovereign definer of rights and
duties, world history, or proletarian revolution).’60 Strauss, as part of this tradition,
called for the subjection of political action and the vagaries of opinion to the
authority of philosophical reason. Using Arendt’s specific lexicon, we might say
Strauss sought to transcend human plurality and overcome the ‘fundamental
relativity’ of the ‘interhuman realm’.61
In summary, Strauss held historicism and relativism to blame for the crisis of
authority in modern society; the decadent amoralism of liberalism needed to be
53 This particular critique of neoconservatism also applies to some critical international theory.
According to Andrew Linklater, the ‘fundamental conflict in the world system’ is not between
states, but competing ideologies – emancipatory versus all others. Beyond Realism and Marxism:
Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 21.
54 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York,
Schocken, 2005), p. 302.
55 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 247.
56 Ibid., p. 241.
57 Ibid., p. 247.
58 Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 92–4.
59 Arendt, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, Social Research, 71:3 (2004), p. 428.
60 Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror, p. 94.
61 Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968), p. 27.
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defeated. In praising the founding of the American republic, early neoconservatives
drew attention to the dangers not only from outside tyrannies but from weakness
within. As already indicated, a central flaw of secular liberal democracy, on this view,
was the failure of modern individuals to believe that the good life rested on anything
more than individual preference. To see how this is captured presently, we turn again
to a modern-day neoconservative thinker. One wholly ‘negative consequence of the
disestablishment of religion as a publicly sanctioned mythos’, Kristol wrote, ‘has
been the inability of liberal society ever to come up with a convincing and generally
accepted theory of political obligation’.62 If the good life can be found in private
pursuits, what motive is there for public-spiritedness, public action?
The only salvation for the modern masses was to enter into mortal combat over
values. Indeed, for Strauss, this was the essence of political life. The political was
above all defined by the struggle for power, ‘characterized by conflicts between men
asserting opposed claims’.63 Strauss, like Carl Schmitt with whom he conducted a
close dialogue, viewed politics as an antagonistic struggle to the death.64 Just as Nazi
ideology had stepped into the breach in interwar Europe, the most ruthless and
articulate men of action were destined to fill the spiritual and political vacuum
created by liberal modernity. Strauss’s project in the revival of political philosophy
was to ensure the postwar moral and spiritual vacuum was appropriately filled.
In direct contrast to Strauss, Arendt frequently warned that the hierarchical
ordering of philosophy over politics was a denial of the fundamental relativity of all
political opinion and action. Rather than see the dangers in the loss of traditional
authority, Arendt saw the contingency and relativity of political aﬀairs as an
opportunity. Unlike Weber, who saw modern humanity stranded in an ‘iron-cage’ of
rationality,65 Arendt held out more hope for the promise of democratic politics.
‘Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure’, she wrote, ‘and rules
under which to subsume the particular, a being whose essence is beginning may have
enough of origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and
to judge without the customary rules which is morality’.66 Rather than posing a
nihilistic threat, Arendt believed that the abandonment of Plato’s hierarchy bestowed
62 Kristol, Two Cheers, p. 64.
63 Strauss, Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, pp. 59, 51.
64 See Heinrich Meier (ed.), Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago, IL:
Chicago University Press, 1995) and Leo Strauss, ‘Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the
Political’, in Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
pp. 83–107.
65 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Sribner’s Sons, 1976),
p. 181.
66 Arendt, Essays in Understanding, p. 321. Arendt always associated the political promise of this form
of freedom with the ability to create something new. This faculty of action was rooted in St
Augustine’s concept of natality; the fact of human birth suggests that we are, in fact, new
beginners. Each new life is a new beginning and through political action with a plurality of others
it is possible to make new beginnings throughout our lives. That we may begin the world anew,
however, does not mean that we have the power to control it. Political actors rarely gain what they
set out to achieve. Their goals are always overrun by the nature of political action where, just as in
war, the totally unexpected is normal. See Origins, p. 478; Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy,
p. 13. Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued that Arendt’s account of natality may point us in the
direction of a more pacific form of politics, a ‘pacific image that evokes love, not war’. Meditations
on Modern Political Thought: Masculine/Feminine Themes from Luther to Arendt (New York:
Praeger, 1986), p. 110. This is a stretch, not least given Arendt’s view of love as ‘the most powerful
of all antipolitical forces’. The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958),
p. 242.
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a dignity on politics largely absent in the modern age; ‘the abandonment of this
hierarchy . . . is the abandonment of all hierarchical structures’.67
At the same time Arendt’s embrace of contingency required recognition of the
limits of political action and the human capacity to change the world (including with
violence) through the application of correct ideology. Neoconservative ideology
embraces the use of violence to enact political change. But Arendt, like Clausewitz,
fully understood the ‘all-pervading unpredictability, which we encounter the moment
we approach the realm of violence’.68 Arendt understood the limitations of using
violence to achieve expansive political ends in a way that challenges the apparent ease
with which many neoconservatives imagined they could achieve a military victory
and then a stable political order in Iraq. Violence can remain rational only to the
extent that it is aimed at achieving short-term goals and any justification ‘loses its
plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future’.69 For ‘while the
results of men’s actions are beyond the actors’ control’, Arendt wrote, ‘violence
harbors within itself an additional element of arbitrariness’.70
War, like all forms of violence, Arendt argued, requires justification in terms of the
ends it pursues. This justification, which always involves political speech to a judging
audience, is the most important element – the most political aspect – of any political
theory of war. Violence may be justified by appeals to the end that its perpetrators
seek to achieve. Arendt is clear, however, that there are no objective criteria to judge
whether a particular act of violence is or is not justified. It is wholly determined by
the performative act of justification and the judgement of those who are being
addressed. The task is to persuade the audience that the violence was necessary and
it is the audience alone that may judge. Violence is always instrumental and can only
be justified for short term ends due to the overwhelming tendency for violence to
spiral out of control, to initiate unintended consequences, in short, to overrun any
potential (perhaps even justifiable) end.
Both political action and war initiate processes that can never be predicted by the
principal actors themselves. Eﬀorts to contain the unpredictability of the political
realm, the search for extra-political groundings, whether based on ancient philosophy
or any modern political ideology, are self-defeating and almost invariably violent.
In 1975, Irving Kristol wrote that ‘ ‘‘You can’t beat a horse with no horse’’, and
the horses of modern politics’, in neoconservative thought, ‘are ideologies and the
social visions they embody’.71 Returning to neoconservative justifications for the
Iraq war, the next section argues that errors in its conception and execution,
including the wilful denial of a number of factual truths, can be explained in terms of
67 Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 29; Canovan, Hannah Arendt, ch. 7.
68 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 107. For a longer discussion of Arendt on these and other
war-related themes, see Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations and the
Thought of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
69 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 151.
70 Arendt was unimpressed by the eﬀorts of military technicians to overcome the unexpected in war;
‘nowhere does Fortuna, good or ill luck play a more fateful role in human aﬀairs than on the
battlefield’. This element of the unexpected could not ‘be eliminated by simulations, scenarios,
game theories, and the like’. Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 106.
71 Mark Gerson, ‘Reflections of a Neoconservative Disciple’, in Christopher DeMuth and William
Kristol (eds.), The Neoconservative Imagination: Essays in Honor of Irving Kristol (Washington, DC:
AEI Press, 1995), p. 169. Arendt understood ideologies as powerful political weapons given their
‘tremendous power of persuasion’. They appealed to ‘immediate political needs’ without which the
specifics of the ideologies could not even have been imagined. Origins, pp. 159, 163.
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neoconservative ideological passions. They ended up having an ‘hypnotic eﬀect’
putting ‘to sleep . . . common sense, which’, as Arendt reminds us, ‘is nothing else but
our mental organ for perceiving, understanding, and dealing with reality and
factuality’.72
The public and the politics of war
Neoconservative thinking about world politics cuts through several of the treasured
theoretical distinctions upon which most international theory rests. Consider the
literature on so-called ‘humanitarian’ military intervention, a literature dominated
by liberals and constructivists.73 The peculiarities of disciplinary theory-building,
especially the eﬀort to debunk a narrow view of realism, has led liberal and
constructivist scholars to downplay US ‘interests’ in explaining ‘humanitarian
intevention’. Little or no engagement with the very diﬀerent neoconservative defence
of such wars has appeared in academe.74 Neoconservatives say they want to change
the world to one more favourable to human rights; they just believe that liberal
arguments for ‘humanitarian’ war are based on faulty premises.75 Neoconservatives
describe the military interventions in Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999)
as early examples of ‘preemptive intervention’, justified as the use of ‘force to
preempt harm to those nations’ citizens and their neighbors when there was no direct
threat to the United States’.76 On this view, the pre-emptive war over Iraq was not a
radical departure from US foreign policy practice or international norms regulating
the use of force.
Recall the neoconservative criticism of classical realism as contributing to the
problem of relativism. Uncomfortable grounding foreign policy in high ideals and
moral crusades, realists counsel caution. They assume that states, even authoritarian
regimes, are rational and even predictable, restrained by self-interest and the wish to
survive. Classical realist scepticism of the high rhetoric of world transformation and
missionary zeal derives from gloomy assumptions about human nature, power, and
the constraints of the interstate system. Order and stability matter most for realists,
despite the unfortunate human costs. Practitioners of realpolitik advocate action for
72 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 110.
73 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jennifer Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
74 NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention played an important role in the transformation of foreign
policy views in the Republican Party in the United States, turning many into neoconservatives
broadly defined. Many Republicans opposed the intervention on the grounds that it was counter to
traditional (realist) national interests. But Republicans such as Senator John McCain, though
ambivalent until NATO started dropping bombs, became much more interventionist. At the same
time, influential neoconservative writers such as William Kristol were arguing for the moral
imperative to intervene and supported McCain over George W. Bush in the Republican primaries
of 2000 because he was potentially more ‘neocon’.
75 According to Kaplan and Kristol, when Europeans complain about ‘unilateral’ military US actions
in favour of some ‘consensus of the ‘‘world community’’ ’ they are actually ‘practicing a form of
power politics dressed up as international morality’. The UN, a collection of nation-states, most of
them corrupt, should not be considered a higher moral authority than the United States. This is to
falsely assume that US interests and those of ‘humanity are inherently incompatible’. The War Over
Iraq, pp. 93, 92, 112.
76 Kaplan and Kristol, The War Over Iraq, pp. 87–8.
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narrow national interest, not abstract ideals. Morgenthau thought of ‘interests
defined in terms of power’ and preferred order over unrealisable international justice.
He understood the tragedy of the political, the undecided conflict.77 What was good
today could be evil tomorrow.
From the neoconservative perspective, these classical realist views not only
misunderstand the dangerous character of America’s enemies. Realism misconstrues
the nature of the political and is itself a reflection of moral decay. Its soulless
philosophy is less an American Cold War strategy than an ‘unsentimental realpolitik
practiced by . . . European statesmen like Bismarck and Metternich’.78 It represents in
the international realm everything that is wrong with modern politics. The political
is defined by the struggle between good and evil. To deny this is to rob the modern
individual of a vibrant source of moral purpose. The American people, Kristol wrote,
‘really do believe that there is such a thing as the ‘‘public interest’’ – a res publica that
is something more than the summation of individual interests’.79 To express this
national-public interest in the international sphere is the goal of neoconservative
international thought. Indeed, the domestic and the international are brought
together into a coherent and powerful whole in a manner unmatched by realism.80
Through a moral foreign policy with which the American people can identify the
domestic and the international are united in a celebration of national greatness. In
liberating Iraq, America also potentially frees itself to pursue its global mission. The
biggest danger, however, even before the 9/11 attacks, was that the American people
would be afraid to utilise their unmatched power to shape the world further to their
advantage.81 Global peace and liberal democratic principles depend on it; the
alternative is the collapse of international order and the further disintegration of
republican values. Foreign policy neoconservatives rework ideas about American
national origin and ‘republican virtue’ in an eﬀort to mobilise a political base around
distinctive foreign policies supported by particular forms of public rhetoric.82 What
are these values and rhetorical norms practised in the ideal neoconservative public?
What is the content of public discourse and what is its relationship to the politics of
justifying war?
Strauss viewed religion as central to maintaining moral purpose in the life of
modern liberal citizens; neoconservatives tap into the religiosity of US society
(combined with Jeﬀersonian republic-worship) in a way more naturally secular
liberals find more diﬃcult. Indeed, especially in the domestic sphere, a combination
of religion and aggressive nationalism become the central political ideology of the
Republic. The primary attachment of the majority of citizens should be toward
national greatness. A reverence for the Founding Fathers, itself often approaching a
religious fervour, supports neoconservative ideas about American values being
triumphant and universal, that certain truths are ‘self-evident’ in nature, and in the
77 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
78 Kaplan and Kristol, The War Over Iraq, p. 46, second emphasis added.
79 Kristol, Reﬂections of a Neoconservative, pp. xiv–xv.
80 Williams, ‘What is the National Interest?’.
81 Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.), Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American
Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000).
82 This practice is not unique to neoconservatives. President Clinton pointed to the historical struggles
over the place of multicultural diversity in the United States as part of the ‘liberal’ narrative of
‘humanitarian war’ over Kosovo in 1999.
278 Patricia Owens
moral character of the American people. An over-riding commitment to these
national and civic values gives meaning to the body politic, to the American regime.
Neoconservatives believe, or want the public to believe, that the founding
principles of the Republic are self-evident truths applicable to all across time and
place. Yet political participation of only a certain kind is praised. Unruly action in
multiple and diverse public spaces is feared. Civil disobedience and anti-war
dissenters are treated with suspicion. The ideal citizen votes, is a patriot, holds
traditional values about family and state; they shop and follow their gut instincts.
They are spectators, especially of foreign policy, aroused to support the ‘national
interest’ in an emotional way they know to be right. Neoconservative leaders are men
of action. But this is not government action to correct social ills related to class,
gender or race. The ideal civic engagement is ‘faith-based’ initiatives, a form of
compassionate conservativism rather than social-democratic action in favour of
redistributive justice.
The compassion of the ‘American people’ has traditionally been represented as the
political terrain of the liberal-Left. But the sentiment has more recently been
appropriated in the popular language and ideology of the Christian Right. The moral
tone of ‘compassionate conservatism’ revolves around the distinctly neoconservative
symbolism of faith and social attachment to the (traditional) family, nation and
God.83 As Arendt might remark, President Bush has sought ‘to raise compassion to
the rank of the supreme political passion and of the highest political virtue’.84
Compassionate conservatism is based on a moral clarity, explicitly billed as a
corrective to the immoral, decadent, Clinton years. The religiosity of the Bush
administration is not new to the United States or unique to the political right. And
yet the political mobilisation of the religious right has been central to the shift of
compassion from a liberal to a conservative concept and has shaped both domestic
and foreign policy discourse.
Central to this vision is the resoluteness, moral clarity and good intentions of the
President as a leader of the nation and commander-in-chief. As Strauss put it, the
‘only thing which can be held to be unqualifiedly good is . . . not the cultivation of
the mind . . . but a good intention, and of good intentions everyone is as capable as
everyone else, wholly independently of good education.’85 In the absence of
discovering weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Bush not only evoked the higher
political objective of ‘freeing’ the Iraqi people, but also his moral clarity. The
emphasis on emotion and gut instincts, a disregard for facts in favour of statements
about the ‘march of freedom’, is typical of a presidency famously dismissive of
nuance, and makes more sense in light of neoconservative ideas.
In a rare prime-time presidential press conference this question was asked: ‘One of
the biggest criticisms of you is that whether it’s WMD in Iraq, postwar planning in
Iraq, or even the question of whether this administration did enough to ward oﬀ 9/11,
you never admit a mistake. Is that a fair criticism? And do you believe there were any
errors in judgment that you made related to any of those topics?’86 President Bush did
83 Marvin Olasky, Compassionate Conservatism: What it is, What is Does, and How it can Transform
America (foreword by George W. Bush) (New York: Free Press, 2000).
84 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 70.
85 Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 22.
86 ‘President Addresses the Nation in Prime Time Press Conference’, 13 April 2004. Available at:
〈http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040413–20.html〉 [accessed 20 June 2006].
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not respond directly in the terms of the question. Rather he referred to America’s new
war-footing and how the 9/11 attacks could not have been predicted. On Iraq, he
said:
The people know where I stand. I mean, in terms of Iraq, I was very clear about what I
believed. And, of course, I want to know why we haven’t found a weapon yet. But I still
know Saddam Hussein was a threat, and the world is better oﬀ without Saddam Hussein. I
don’t think anybody can – maybe people can argue that. I know the Iraqi people don’t
believe that, that they’re better oﬀ with Saddam Hussein – would be better oﬀ with Saddam
Hussein in power. I also know that there’s an historic opportunity here to change the world.
And it’s very important for the loved ones of our troops to understand that the mission is
an important, vital mission for the security of America and for the ability to change the
world for the better. (Emphases added.)
The President’s denial of the likelihood of error is made possible through accepting
the logic of a world-changing idea, an ideology. The content of the ideology matters
less than what ideology does to the mind and the kind of explanation that it allows.
The drive behind Bush’s position, and the kind of thinking that enables it, was
identified long ago by Arendt. It ‘is based not so much on superior intelligence as on
the correct interpretation of the essentially reliable forces in history or nature, forces
which neither defeat nor ruin can prove wrong because they are bound to assert
themselves in the long run’.87 The forces of history in neoconservative thought are
men of action founding the right political regimes. History has proved them right and
ideology is a means to this end. ‘Its subject matter is history’, Arendt wrote, ‘to which
the ‘‘idea’’ is applied; the result of this application is not a body of statements about
something that is, but the unfolding of a process . . . They [ideologies] are historical,
concerned with becoming and perishing . . . The ‘‘idea’’ of an ideology . . . has
become an instrument of explanation’.88 The instrument of explanation in neo-
conservative ideology, and expressed in Bush’s rhetoric, is the self-evident truths
established at the founding of the American regime, the superiority of American
values and the inevitability of the march of freedom. The question of error or regret
need not be addressed. Certain forms of public rhetoric enable troublesome facts to
be downplayed. Indeed, certain ideological conviction need not admit of the
possibility of a substantial mistake.
To change the world is ideologically mandated in neoconservative thought. When
combined with a real capacity to act, when neoconservative ideas are listened to by
the powerful and shape public rhetoric, there is a great temptation to exaggerate the
possibilities for doing so. In 2003, Vice President Dick Cheney remarked that the
early signs of widespread armed resistance to the US occupation were the last gasps
of the defunct Baathist regime. But as Arendt wrote in the 1960s, ‘To call such
unexpected, unpredicted, unpredictable happenings ‘‘random events’’ or ‘‘the last
gasps of the past’’, condemning them to irrelevance or the famous ‘‘dustbin of
87 Arendt, Origins, p. 349. Arendt’s writing on the Vietnam War suggested that such beliefs went
some of the way toward explaining how apparently intelligent individuals in the inner circles of
government can be so badly mistaken in their understanding of political realities. In particular, see
‘Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers’, in Crises of the Republic.
88 Arendt, Origins, p. 469. She took total ideological explanations for world history to be destructive
of political freedom. ‘For respect for human dignity implies the recognition of my fellow-men or
our fellow-nations as subjects, as builders of worlds or cobuilders of a common world. No ideology
which aims at the explanation of all historical events of the past and at mapping out the course of
events of the future can bear the unpredictability which springs from the fact that men are creative,
that they can bring forward something so new that nobody ever foresaw it’. Origins, p. 458.
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history’’, is the oldest trick in the trade; the trick, no doubt, helps in clearing up the
theory, but at the price of removing it further from reality’.89 Great power is perhaps
most likely to fall into this trap, as evidenced in the hubris of the Bush administration
prior to the war in Iraq, the refusal to see, or admit to seeing, the real diﬃculties that
would lie ahead.
For factual truths about the nature of Iraqi society, about the ambiguity of
pre-war intelligence, about the limits of the power of high-tech warfare possess no
inherent right to be as they are. In the political realm, all factual truths are
contingent; they ‘carry no inherent truth within themselves, no necessity to be as they
are’.90 There was no necessary reason why Iraq did not pose an urgent threat to the
United States. There was no necessary reason Saddam did not possess weapons of
mass destruction. There was no necessary reason Iraq was not supporting al Qaeda
or seeking uranium from Niger. There was no necessary reason the invasion and
occupation would not be a ‘cake walk’. There was no necessary reason all Iraqis
would not greet ‘liberation’ with flowers. There was no necessary reason why the first
insurgents were not the last gasp of the defunct Baathist regime. But there is also no
necessary reason why America should ultimately win.
Conclusion
‘Strangely . . .’ Arendt remarked, ‘the clash of factual truth and politics . . . has – in
some respects, at least – very similar traits’ to the clash between philosophy and
politics.91 The whole purpose of political action is to bring into being something
new. Action is ‘the very stuﬀ politics are made of’.92 For Arendt, this freedom
requires an ability to imagine that things as they are may be diﬀerent, to refuse to
accept the ‘unyielding, blatant, unpersuasive stubbornness’ of what is.93 Truth may
be stubborn but factual truth, in particular, is the most vulnerable because it is easily
outmanoeuvred by the constantly changing world. Political action and the lie have
something deeply in common; ‘the deliberate denial of factual truth – the ability to
lie – and the capacity to change facts – the ability to act – are interconnected; they
owe their existence to the same source: imagination’.94 In The Neoconservative
Imagination, a collection of essays in honour of Irving Kristol, political engagement
is presented as key to this practical philosophy.95 The goal is not only to advise
statesmen. It is to eﬀect dramatic social change. Thus we see the particular reasons
why neoconservative thought appears to have trouble with factual truth.
Arendt was far from naı¨ve when it came to the place of lying in the political realm.
In her words, ‘the lie did not creep into politics by some accident of human sinfulness.
Moral outrage, for this reason alone, is not likely to make it disappear’.96 Govern-
ments lie during wartime for a variety of reasons; it is endemic to the practice of war;
89 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 110.
90 Ibid., p. 6.
91 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 236.
92 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 6.
93 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 237.
94 Ibid., p. 5.
95 DeMuth and Kristol (eds.), The Neoconservative Imagination.
96 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 6.
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‘lying as such is neither new nor necessarily foolish in politics. Lies have always been
regarded as justifiable in emergencies, lies that concerned specific secrets, especially in
military matters, which had to be shielded against the enemy’.97 Indeed, following
Machiavelli, the realist tradition is most often associated with deceit. To step from
Strauss’s exposition of what he took to be Plato’s distinction between exoteric and
esoteric writing to the gap between rhetoric and reality characteristic of the Bush
administration fails to appreciate the inherent clash between politics and truth of
every kind. It is not the idea of the ‘noble lie’ that should concern us. As Arendt once
remarked, ‘political secrecy hardly ever ends in anything nobler than the vulgar
duplicity of a spy’.98 She dismissed Strauss’s ‘noble lie’ reading of Plato without ever
mentioning his name.99
The more general problem is not individual wickedness, or the content of any
particular theory, but the nature of the political realm itself. There is an inevitable
clash between politics and factual truth. But it is made even worse by the ideological
assumptions of neoconservative thought. The point is not to argue that neoconserva-
tive policies are more likely to lead to public lies. Liberals also tend to defend ‘human
rights’ wars, even when exposed as hypocritical. Hypocrisy, a form of lie, is
sometimes condoned by liberals because the alternative is worse: human rights are
revealed to be the conceit of the powerful.100 Neoconservatives similarly defend high
ideals, even when hypocritically evoked, because they are necessary to give the public
something to believe in and fight for. Both liberals and neoconservatives politically
cheat for the same reason; they desire to change the world and believe in the power
of ideas to do so. There is something particular about the neoconservative temptation
to deny certain factual truths. But it is also in the very ‘nature of the political realm
to be at war with truth in all its forms’.101 It is for this reason, not for any noble lie,
that men and women of action appear to so easily trade in falsehoods.
An excess of moral clarity not only leads to bad foreign policy – the realists show
us that – but the denial of political facts, Arendt also suggested, is destructive of the
public culture necessary for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ to make sense at all. The
outcome of this conflict between Arendt and the neoconservatives holds important
implications for the place of ideas and ideology in shaping political judgements about
contemporary war. The danger, for Arendt, was that ‘ideological thinking ruins all
relationships with reality’.102 Ideology will not substitute for reality. As neoconserva-
tives have learned in Iraq, reality has ‘no substitute’ and no ideology can substitute
for thought. The world catches up because the ideological thinker ‘can remove his
97 Arendt, Responsibility and Judgement (New York, Schocken, 2003), p. 264.
98 Arendt, Origins, p. 218.
99 In a footnote Arendt wrote: ‘I hope no one will tell me any more that Plato was the inventor of
the ‘‘noble lie’’. This belief rested on a misreading of a crucial passage (414C) in The Republic,
where Plato speaks of one his myths . . . as a o. Since the same Greek word signifies
‘‘fiction’’, ‘‘error’’, and ‘‘lie’’ according to context – when Plato wants to distinguish between error
and lie, the Greek language forces him to speak of ‘‘involuntary’’ and ‘‘voluntary’’ o . . .;
under no circumstances can it be understood as a recommendation of lying as we understand it.
Plato, of course, was permissive about occasional lies to deceive the enemy or insane people . . .
But contrary to the cave allegory, no principle is involved in these passages.’ Between Past and
Future, p. 298f.
100 See Owens, Between War and Politics, ch. 6.
101 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 239.
102 Arendt, Origins, p. 474.
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mind from it but not his body’,103 or we might add the bodies of those in American
uniform. Neoconservatives may be experts at selling war. They seem less adept at
winning them.
103 Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 36.
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